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Abstract: The paper provides new sufficient conditions for 
consistent and coherent Bayesian inference when a model is 
invariant under some group of transformations. Building on 
our theoretical results we reexamine an example from Stone 
(1976) giving some new insights. The priors for multivariate 
normal models and Structural Vector AutoRegression models 
that entail consistent and coherent Bayesian inference are also 
discussed. 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper contributes to the line of research whose main goal is to determine 
conditions under which the Bayesian inference is not strongly inconsistent in Stone’s 
(1976) sense, coherent in de Finetti’s sense (Dutch book) or coherent in the sense of 
Heath and Sudderth (1978) (precise definition to be given later). Informally, when 
strong inconsistency or incoherence arises, an adoption of the frequency approach and 
Bayesian inference for the same model may result in very different and sometimes 
paradoxical conclusions. Although a Bayesian inference that corresponds to a 
posterior with a proper prior, which is a countable additive measure, is always 
coherent and not strongly inconsistent, an inference with improper prior need not be 
coherent and may be strongly inconsistent. Since improper priors are widely used, the 
problem is very serious. The literature on strong inconsistency and/or incoherence 
contains many interesting but also striking results. One of them concerns the use of 
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the Jeffreys’ prior when we have a sample of n  random variables , where 
 ( 2m ) and . For example, Eaton and Sudderth (1995), 
Eaton and Freedman (2004) showed that the Jeffreys’ prior in such a case (i.e. 
proportional to 
1, , ny y…
m
iy ∈ \ ≥ . . .iy i i d∼ (0, )N Σ
1
2( 1)| | m− +Σ ) leads to incoherent posteriors in the sense of Heath and 
Sudderth (1978), incoherent in de Finetti’s sense (Dutch book) and strongly 
inconsistent in the Stone’s (1976) sense. Moreover, Eaton and Sudderth (1993, 1998), 
Eaton and Freedman (2004) showed that predictive distributions in this model under 
the Jeffreys’ prior are incoherent in de Finetti’s sense, in the sense of Heath and 
Sudderth (1978) and strongly inconsistent in the Stone’s (1976) sense. Those 
conclusions are far–reaching and imply that incoherence may arise in basic models 
even with standard priors. It also suggests that the priors in Simultaneous Equations 
Models (SEM) or Vector AutoRegression (VAR) models that are proportional to 
1
2( 1)| | m− +Σ  are incoherent and strongly inconsistent. Unfortunately, the matters are 
even worse. Except Bernardo’s reference prior (see e.g. Yang and Berger (1994)), all 
non–informative priors for SEM or VAR models proposed in the literature have the 
form | , for some α  (see e.g. Drèze (1976), Zellner (1977), and entries 3–7 as 
listed in table 1 in Keyes and Levy (1996)). Perhaps surprisingly, Eaton and 
Sudderth (1998), Eaton (2008) showed that any prior in the form |  leads to 
incoherent and strongly inconsistent predictive distributions in multivariate normal 
model i.e. a coherent predictive distribution is built on the prior that can not be cast 
in the form | , for any α . We think the above claims make the concepts of 
strong inconsistency and incoherence very interesting research topic. 
|αΣ ∈ \
|αΣ
|αΣ ∈ \
In all considerations about strong inconsistency and incoherence special role is 
reserved for the prior induced by the right Haar invariant measure on a group that 
acts in a model (see section IV for formal statement)1. For reference, let us call such 
a prior the right Haar prior. It turns out that any predictive distribution that is not 
based on the right Haar prior is incoherent and strongly inconsistent, see e.g. Eaton 
and Sudderth (1998,1999), Eaton and Freedman (2004), Eaton (2008). Parallel 
results of Eaton and Sudderth (2002,2004) and Eaton and Freedman (2004) indicate 
that any Bayesian posterior that is not derived under the right Haar prior must be 
strongly inconsistent and incoherent. However the question whether the Bayesian 
posterior or predictive distribution derived under the right Haar prior is not strongly 
                                                 
1 One may say ‘again’. It is remarkable in how many problems the right Haar invariant measure turns out to be 
really the “right” choice. For an incomplete survey see e.g. Helland (2004) and references therein. 
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inconsistent (i.e. consistent) or coherent, has no definite answer. Some further 
conditions are needed. 
One criterion for coherence of Bayesian posterior under the improper prior was 
given by Heath and Sudderth (1978). The posterior is coherent if the improper prior 
may be replaced with some finitely additive (proper) prior which gives the same 
posterior as that under the improper prior, see Heath and Sudderth (1978), or the 
posterior is approximable by proper prior, see Heath and Sudderth (1989). Neither 
criterion is easy to apply in practice. Some other coherency conditions are available in 
Lane and Sudderth (1983) but are suitable only when a parameter space or a sample 
space is compact. On the other hand Heath and Sudderth (1978) showed that when a 
parameter space is equal to a sample space (very unrealistic), a model belongs to the 
translation family and a group acting in the model is amenable2, a posterior derived 
under the right Haar prior is coherent. However, the results of Eaton and Sudderth 
(1998,1999,2002,2004) clearly suggest that the above assertion depends crucially on 
the amenability of a group, which appears as the essential sufficient condition for the 
coherent inference.  
Since the group of nonsingular matrices with matrix multiplication as a group 
composition (so–called the general linear group) is not amenable, we are in an 
uncomfortable position. It is so because such a group is the most natural group acting 
in the multivariate normal model with zero mean. However according to the available 
theory represented by Eaton and Sudderth (1998,1999,2002,2004), the lack of 
amenability implies that the right Haar prior in this case is strongly inconsistent. 
Essentially this is the reason why the Jeffreys’ prior in the multivariate normal model 
is condemned by those authors to strong inconsistency and incoherence. Our 
contribution is, to some extent, a partial re–validation of the Jeffreys’ prior. We 
provide an alternative sufficient condition, which does not refer to amenability, but 
guarantees that the right Haar prior leads to consistent and coherent Bayesian 
inference. By our criterion, the coherence of Bayesian inference may be preserved 
even though the group is not amenable. Since non–amenable groups are basic in all 
theoretical considerations (e.g. general linear group, affine group), our contribution 
has obvious merits. 
                                                 
2 Amenability of a group is a rather technical notion. There are many equivalent definitions of the amenability see 
e.g. Bondar (1977), Heath and Sudderth (1978), Eaton and Sudderth (1999), Lehmann and Casella (1998), p. 422. 
More complete discussion is available in Bondar and Milnes (1981). We note that amenability of a group is 
precisely the condition for Hunt–Stein theorem, see e.g. Lehmann (1986), pp. 519–522. 
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II. NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS 
All results in our paper are restricted for invariant models with respect to 
some group of transformations. See e.g. Lehmann (1986), chapter 6, for the theory 
and our assumption 1 for the mathematical definition. By G  we will denote this 
underlying group acting in a model. Basic material on groups, group actions and 
other related notions (sufficient for our problem) may be found in Eaton (1989). By 
 we denote the identity element in a group G . We will extensively use the concepts 
of Haar measures and integrals. Traditional reference is Nachbin (1965), but Eaton 
(1989) and Wijsman (1990) are also useful. We will use the following unified 
notation, : the left Haar invariant measure on a group G ; : the right Haar 
invariant measure on a group G ; : a probability measure on a space S ; : a 
finite measure on a space S . In particular the Lebesgue measure on a space  
will be denoted as ( , where s . We shall denote σ –algebra of Borel subsets of 
a space  as . 
e
Gμ Gν
ηS λS
σ − S
)ds ∈ S
S SB
We will not differentiate between groups and its domain spaces. Thus 
 signifies both the general linear group with matrix 
multiplication as a group composition, and (seen as a space) the space of m m  
nonsingular matrices. Analogous remark relates to : the group (space) of m m  
lower triangular matrices with positive elements on the diagonal; and 
: the group (space) of orthogonal matrices 
(  is the identity matrix). Obviously, a group composition in  and 
 is the usual matrix multiplication. Lastly, a space of m  positive definite 
symmetric matrices will be denoted as . 
{ | det( )m mmGL g g
×= ∈ ≠\ 0}
I }m
Θ
) ( )gB Bλ χ λY Y
( | ) (p y dθ π
Θ
= ∫
×
mLT
+ ×
{ |m mmO g g g gg
× ′ ′= ∈ = =\
I : ( )m m m× mLT +
mO m×
mPD
Let Y  be a random variable (with realization y ) taking on values in  (a 
sample space). Let  be a family of probability measures on Y  
indexed by the parameter θ  i.e. a model. In the sequel, probability measure P  
will be also denoted as . We assume that  has a density  with 
respect to some dominating measure λ , which is relatively left invariant. That is 
, for all B , , where the notation gB  is explained in 
assumption 1 and  is the multiplier, see e.g. Wijsman (1990), pp. 127–
130. Moreover, let {  be a family of posterior distributions on Θ  
determined by a model  and a fixed σ finite prior measure . That is 
, for any B , where m y . 
Having measurable spaces ( ,  and ( , , we assume that the map  
Y
{ | }Pθ θ= ∈P
∈ Θ θ
( | )P θ⋅ Pθ ( | )p y θ
Y
( ) (g= ⋅ ∈ YB g G∈
:Gχ +→ \
| }y yΠ ∈ Y
P − π
1( ) [ ( )] ( | ) ( )y
B
B m y p y d
θ
θ π θ−
∈
Π = ⋅ ∫ Θ∈ B ( ) )θ
)ΘΘ B )YY B ( )yy BΠ6
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is measurable for each . We say that Bayesian inference is proper if 
, a.e. [λ ]. We shall call {  derived under specific , a Bayesian 
inference. Depending on situation,  will be also denoted as . 
−YB B Θ∈ B
( )m y <∞ Y | }y yΠ ∈ Y π
yΠ ( | )yΠ ⋅
We use the symbol “ ” to denote the abstract group operation on some sets. 
On the other hand the group composition will not be symbolically distinguished from 
the usual matrix operation e.g. g  but gh , for  (group) and  (set). 
With abuse of notation, but following Eaton (1989) and a large body of the 
literature, both an action of a group on  and its induced action on Θ  will be 
denoted as g  and g , respectively. With this in mind, the assumption that a 
model  is G invariant reads  
D
θD ,g h G∈ θ ∈ Θ
Y
yD θD
P −
 
Assumption 1 (model G –invariance):  for all g G , 
where B  and .  
( ) (gP Y gB P Y Bθ θ∈ = ∈D )
}
1θ
θ
∈
∈ YB { |gB g y y B= ∈D
 
We say that G  acts transitively on Θ  if for each  there is a g G  
such that . In other words, transitivity means that given , every 
 can be represented as , for some g G . 
1 2,θ θ ∈ Θ ∈
2 gθ = D 0θ ∈ Θ
θ ∈ Θ 0gθ = D ∈
 
Assumption 2 (transitivity): G  acts transitively on Θ . 
 
Assumption 2 is restrictive. It holds only in very simple models (like the 
multivariate normal model with unknown mean and covariance), but more 
complicated models including VAR or SEM violate this assumption. However 
transitivity is assumed (literally) in all works cited in the references in the similar 
context. Otherwise, it appears to be difficult to obtain sharp theoretical results. 
Define the stabilizer Sta , for each s . In fact, 
the stabilizer is a subgroup of G . When ,  , we say that a group 
 acts freely on S . 
b { | }s g G g s s G= ∈ = ⊆D ∈ S
Stab { }s e= ∀ s ∈ S
G
 
Assumption 3 (G  freeness): Stab ;  θ . −Θ { }eθ = ∀ ∈ Θ
 
Assumption 4 (G  freeness): Stab ;  y . −Y { }y e= ∀ ∈ Y
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Assumption 3 may be violated even in basic models. For example in the 
multivariate normal model with mean 0 and unknown covariance that was explicitly 
mentioned in section I, when the underlying group is . However there are models 
for which assumption 3 is fulfilled, see section VI. Sometimes, whether the 
assumption holds or not may be a matter of the clever reparameterization of the 
original model. For instance, if instead of the parameterization of the normal model 
from section I we use an alternative model , for , where  
(m ),  and , then the G  freeness assumption is 
satisfied (provided that ).  
mGL
iy θε= i n
2
W
1, ,i = … miy ∈ \
≥ mLTθ +∈ . . .i i i dε ∼ (0, I )mN −Θ
mG LT
+=
Assumption 4 holds in standard cases before making a sufficiency reduction of 
the sample space (with possibility that we exclude some “singular” points of zero 
measure from the sample space). See e.g. Bondar (1976), Chang and Eaves (1990) for 
some clarifying discussion. We note that assumption 4 appears under the label “FP” 
in Eaton and Sudderth (1999) and “unitary” in Fraser (1968), p. 49.  
In general there is a possibility to weaken assumptions 3 and 4 by requiring 
that both , for each y , and Sta , for each , are compact subgroups 
of , see e.g. Eaton and Sudderth (2002). However in such a case our lucid 
framework would be lost. In fact assumptions 3 and 4 are critical for our proof 
method of the main theorem. 
Staby ∈ Y bθ θ ∈ Θ
G
Let  be a space of some cross section on . That is W is a subset of Y  
that intersects each orbit of Y  in exactly one point
W Y
3. In other words, a cross section 
is in one–to–one correspondence with the orbit space, see e.g. Wijsman (1986,1990). 
It follows that  is also a space of maximal invariant, see e.g. Eaton (1989), p. 28, 
for definition of the maximal invariant. From assumption 4 it follows that the sample 
space is subject to the following factorization 
W
 
G= ×Y           (1) 
 
Hence there is a bijection , g G , , and a group G  acts on G  
according to the rule 
( , )y g w↔ ∈ w ∈W ×W
( , ) : ( , )g g w gg w=D , for every g G∈  (see e.g. Wijsman 
(1986,1990)). 
                                                 
⊆3 The orbit of  is defined as , for each . Y : { | }Gy g y g G= ∈D Y y ∈ Y
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Since we shall work with measures we must ensure that there is a one–to–one 
correspondence between Borel subsets in  and those in G  (i.e. 
bimeasurability) 
Y ×W
 
Regularity condition (RC):  
a) Let Y  and Θ  be complete separable metric locally compact topological 
spaces (i.e. Polish and locally compact). Moreover, let G  be Polish locally compact 
topological group acting continuously on both  and Θ . Y
b) For each y  define the set . Let the bijective map 
,  be a homeomorphism i.e.  and  are continuous. 
∈ Y : { | }Gy g y g G= ∈D
: { }y G Gyγ × → ( )y g gγ = D y
)
θ
)
Gp w g p g wθ χ θ μ∗= ⋅
yγ 1yγ−
 
By RC, it is meaningful to state the next assumption 
 
Assumption 5: A model P is dominated by a product measure  
(remember that we employ our unified notation for measures). 
Gμ η⊗ W
 
The density with respect to  corresponding to  will be denoted as 
. 
Gμ η⊗ W Pθ
( , | )p g w θ
Assumption 5 is very useful in our proof technique of the main theorem, yet it 
holds under our previous assumptions. In fact it can be proved. Here is an informal 
proof in the continuous case. Assume that a model is G invariant. Usually there 
exists a density  with respect to Lebesgue measure i.e. . 
Evidently, Lebesgue measure is relatively left invariant with multiplier  
i.e. , for every g  (just compute the Jacobian). By our RC and 
using Theorem 2 in Bondar (1976), if  is a density with respect to ( , then 
 is a density with respect to , where λ  is some –finite (in 
general not a probability) measure on W . But setting  
where 
−
( | )p y θ∗ ( ) ( | )( )P dy p y dyθ θ∗=
:Gχ +→ \
( ) ( )(d g y g dyχ=D G∈
( | )p y θ∗ )dy
( ) ( , | )g p g wχ ∗⋅ Gμ λ⊗ W W σ
( ) ( | ) (dw p w dwη θ λ=W W
( | ) ( ) ( , | ) ( )dg∫  we can easily verify that 
 is a density with respect to  as 
stipulated by assumption 5. In fact,  is a version of the conditional density 
of g  given w  (and θ ), so as 
( , | ) ( ) ( , | )/ ( | )p g w g p g w p wθ χ θ θ∗= ⋅ Gμ η⊗ W
( , | )p g w θ
 
( , | ) ( ) 1Gp g w dgθ μ =∫         (2) 
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Under assumption 5, the G invariance of a model implies that densities are 
subject to the following identity, see e.g. Zidek (1969) or Dawid et al. (1973) 
−
 
( , | ) ( , | )p g w p gg w gθ θ= D ;  a.e. [ ], for each Gμ η⊗ W g G∈   (3) 
 
III. STRONG INCONSISTENCY 
 Let a model  be fixed. Assume that Bayesian delivers the posterior  using 
some prior  (which may be such that  provided that  a.e. 
[λ ]). Formal definition of the strong inconsistency is as follows 
P yΠ
π ( )π Θ =∞ ( )m y <∞
Y
 
Definition 1: A Bayesian inference i.e.  derived under specific π , 
is said to be strongly inconsistent (with a model ) iff there is a bounded, ( )–
measurable function  such that: 
{ | }y yΠ ∈ Y
P Θ×YB B
:φ ×Θ→ \Y
inf ( , ) ( | ) sup ( , ) ( | )
y
y P dy y d y
θ
φ θ θ φ θ θ> Π∫ ∫  
 
Strong inconsistency is a very undesirable (finite sample) property first noticed 
by Stone (1976). His ideas were formalized in the form of definition 1 by Lane and 
Sudderth (1983). For interpretation, intuition and discussion see Heath and Sudderth 
(1978), Sudderth (1994), Eaton and Freedman (2004), Eaton and Sudderth (2004), 
Eaton (2008). Moreover, Eaton and Freedman (2004) proved that strong 
inconsistency (in our countably additive setup) is equivalent to de Finetti’s 
incoherence or existence of the Dutch book (that can be made against ). Thus 
throughout the paper we will use the terms “consistency” and “coherence” 
interchangeably. Overall, by the compelling arguments used in the above cited works, 
an avoidance of Bayesian inference that is strongly inconsistent should be 
recommended. 
yΠ
We say that the Bayesian inference is consistent with a model  (in short, 
consistent), or equivalently that the Bayesian inference is coherent, iff for every 
bounded, ( )–measurable function  we have 
P
Θ×YB B :φ ×Θ→ \Y
 
inf ( , ) ( | ) sup ( , ) ( | )
y
y P dy y d y
θ
φ θ θ φ θ θ≤ Π∫ ∫      (4) 
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If  (and  is countably additive)( )π Θ <∞ π 4, the corresponding Bayesian inference is 
coherent, see e.g. Heath and Sudderth (1978). However the converse does not hold. 
There are coherent inferences which are based on improper prior: not every coherent 
inference may be derived from a proper (countably additive) prior see e.g. Lane and 
Sudderth (1983). The problem is to find a class of improper priors subject to some 
constraints on the inferential framework, which result in coherent Bayesian inference. 
This is the aim of our paper. To proceed further we only need the last assumption 
 
Assumption 6:  is G invariant i.e. , for 
every . 
:φ ×Θ→ \Y − ( , ) ( ,g y g yφ θ φ=D D )θ
( ))B f Bπ ν −=
                                                
g G∈
 
Assumption 6 is crucial to obtain the main theorem. We note that it is not 
universally acceptable but was also adopted in Eaton and Sudderth (1999,2002). 
 
IV. A PRIOR INDUCED BY THE RIGHT HAAR INVARIANT MEASURE 
Being in our model setup (defined with our assumptions), we know that the 
only class of improper priors that may entail coherent inference is the prior induced 
by the right Haar invariant measure, see Eaton and Sudderth (2002,2004) and Eaton 
and Freedman (2004). To prepare the ground for the next section we should clarify 
the notion of this prior. If a group G  acts transitively and freely on a parameter 
space then there is a bijection between a group G  and a parameter space Θ . 
Intuitively, the parameter space is just a group (seen as a space). Since by our RC a) 
a group G  possesses a unique (up to a constant) right Haar invariant measure it is 
natural to find the induced measure on . To this end, let us define a continuous 
bijective function  defined as , where  may be chosen 
arbitrarily. If G  is second countable (e.g. a subspace of , which will usually be the 
case in applications) then by our RC a) it follows that  is a 
homeomorphism (see e.g. lemma 2.3.17 in Wijsman (1990)). In such a case we are in 
a position to define the induced measure (i.e. a prior) on . If  denotes the right 
Haar measure on G , the induced prior measure π  on Θ  is defined as 
, for all B . Then 
Θ
:f G →Θ 0( )f g g θ= D 0θ ∈ Θ
n\
:f G →Θ
Θ Gν
1( ) : (G Θ∈ B
 
 
4 The requirement of the countable additivity should be emphasized. Indeed, not every finitely additive (proper) 
prior has a posterior for a given model, see e.g. Heath and Sudderth (1989). 
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1 0( )
( ) ( ) ( ) (G
g f B B
h g dg h d
θ
θ ν θ π θ−∈ ∈=∫ ∫D )
)
      (5) 
 
where h  is any integrable function, see e.g. Lehmann (1986), p. 43. We note that the 
induced prior measure  is the same for any  used in  mapping (see e.g. 
Lehmann and Casella (1998), pp. 249–250). In fact when a group G  acts transitively 
and freely on , then the only measure that is independent of the reference point  
is the right invariant Haar measure, see Villegas (1981). This constitutes the 
additional self–evident virtue of the right Haar invariant measure. Thus we may 
indifferently set  (this remark will be used in section VI). Putting  in 
(5) we have 
π 0θ ∈ Θ f
Θ 0θ
0 eθ = B = Θ
 
0( ) ( ) ( ) (G
G
h g dg h dθ ν θ π θ
Θ
=∫ ∫D        (6) 
 
Then we say that the prior  is induced by the right Haar invariant measure. The 
formula (6) will prove essential in analytical integral manipulations. 
π
 
V. MAIN RESULT 
It is hard to talk about coherence in the case when the Bayesian inference is 
improper. One may say that propriety is a prerequisite of any Bayesian inference (not 
only a coherent one). The following lemma provides very useful property of the prior 
induced by the right Haar invariant measure. Namely, Bayesian inference derived 
under such a prior is proper 
 
Lemma (Bondar (1977)): Under assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and RC: 
0( | ) ( )Gp y g dgθ ν <∞∫ D  a.e. [ ]  λY
 
We are in a position to state the main result in our paper 
 
Theorem: Let a model  be given. Under assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and RC, 
the Bayesian inference derived under the prior induced by the right Haar invariant 
measure on G  is consistent with a model  (coherent). 
P
P
Proof: see appendix. 
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VI. STONE’S EXAMPLE 
It is inevitable in the context of our theorem to discuss the Stone’s (1976) 
example B. The reason is that this example, when superficially taken, may be 
considered as a counter–example to our theorem. In fact this example convinced 
many researchers that amenability of a group is needed to reach the coherence of 
Bayesian inference. We argue that this is not true. Instead what is crucial for 
coherence (consistency) of Bayesian inference (except the transitivity assumption) is 
the G  freeness assumption. −Θ
Stone (1976) in his example B considers the following model 
 
i iy uθ= ,          (7) 1,2.i =
 
where  is vector of observations and . Moreover,  is 
assumed to be nonsingular. Let us write . Then the data sampling 
density with respect to Lebesgue measure reads 
1 2( , )i i iy y y ′= 2(0, I )iu N∼ 2 2θ ×∈ \
1 2[ , ]y y y= ∈ Y
 
( | )p y kθ = ⋅ 2 12| | etr{ ( ) }yyθ − ′ ′− 1θθ −
⋅
y
= 2g GL∈
θ 2
      (8) 
 
where k  is a normalizing constant and et . As a natural group acting in 
the model (7) we take . Evidently, (7) is invariant with the action of 
 on the sample space defined as  and on the parameter space 
, . The prior induced by the right (= left) Haar invariant 
measure on  is . To see this, put  in (6) (  is the 
identity element in the group ) and note that  and 
 (see e.g. Eaton (1989), p. 9). In this case the posterior 
distribution of  is 
r : exp{ {}}tr=
2G GL= 2GL −
2GL :y g y g=6 D
:g gθ θ θ6 D
2GL ( )dπ θ = 2| | ( )dθ − 0 Ieθ = ≡ 2I
2GL :g e g=D 2I g=
2
( )GL dgν = 2| | ( )g dg−
θ
 
( | )d yθΠ ∝ 4 12| | etr{ ( ) }( )yy dθ θθ− ′ ′− 1 θ−       (9) 
 
Denote the posterior density with respect to Lebesgue measure as 
 
( | )p yθ ∝ 4 12| | etr{ ( ) }yyθ − ′ ′− 1θθ −        (10) 
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Now Stone uses a one–to–one decomposition , where  and . 
Inserting y  into (10) we get 
y TC= 2T LT +∈ mC O∈
TC=
 
( | , ) ( | )p T C p Tθ θ= ∝ 4 12| | etr{ ( ) }TTθ − ′ ′− 1θθ −
θ
    (11) 
 
Then Stone pretends that the model is  
 
11
1 221 22
0
[ , ]
y
y T u uy y θ⎡ ⎤≡ = =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦         (12) 
 
and argues that the prior for θ  induced by the right Haar invariant measure on  
leads to strong inconsistency of Bayesian inference. There are two closely related 
flaws in this reasoning. The first one was suggested in a comment on Stone’s article 
i.e. Pratt (1976). That is the model (7) is unidentified i.e. , for all 
. In a rejoinder, Stone (1976) comments on Pratt’s remark: “Pratt asks about 
the significance of the nonidentifiability of . I am sure it is what makes the example 
work”. In our opinion, this is only partially true. We believe that it is 
nonidentifiability together with unrecognizing the effect of changing the pattern of 
the data matrix y  (to the triangular one) that makes the example work. Let us 
clarify this claim. Leaving the nonidentifiability of θ  aside, when  it is no 
longer true that the natural group operating in the example is still . When the 
sample space is , the only group that preserves the pattern of the data is  
(or its subgroup). Hence we must assume that the model is invariant. Then 
nonidentifiability of  enters the scene. Essentially, being in our invariance 
framework, there is only way to deal with it. We should assume that , which 
makes the model identified. Then we arrive exactly at our setup i.e.  acts 
freely on the sample space and transitively and freely on the parameter space. In such 
a case the prior induced by the right Haar invariant measure on  (see below for 
an explicit formulation) makes the Bayesian inference consistent. This is ensured by 
our theorem. But it is so not because the group  is amenable (which is), but 
because its action on the parameter space is free. 
2GL
( | ) ( | )p y p y hθ =
mh O∈
θ
2y LT
+∈
2GL
2LT
+
2LT
+
2LT
+ −
θ
2LTθ +∈
2G LT
+=
2LT
+
2LT
+
When  we could alternatively parameterize the density  in 
terms of positive definite covariance , which is isomorphic to . Thus 
2LTθ +∈ ( | )p y θ
θθ′Σ = 2LTθ +∈
 
( | )p y kΣ = ⋅ 1 12| | etr{ }yy− ′Σ − Σ 1−       (13) 
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 It may be useful to find the implied prior for Σ  from that for θ  (which in turn is 
induced by the right Haar invariant measure). Since it is of some interest we derive 
the prior in the general case where y m , hence . In 
order to satisfy the G  freeness assumption we must have n  and 
. Note that , where  are diagonal 
elements of  (see e.g. Eaton (1989), p. 17). The Jacobian from  to 
 is given by 
1: ( ) [ , , ]nn y y× = ∈… Y
⋅
mLTθ +∈
−Y m≥
rank( )y m= ( 1)
1
( ) ( )
m
m m i
iiLT i
dg g dgν + − − +==∏ iig
mg LT
+∈ mLTθ +∈
mPDΣ ∈ ( 1)1( ) 2
mm m i
iii
J θ θ− − − +=→ Σ = ⋅ =∏ 12[1 ]1mm i=2 | |i −− ⋅ Σ∏ 6 , where 
[1 ] : ( )i jkσΣ =6 ;  (  is a leading principal submatrix of Σ  consisting 
the first i  rows and columns of Σ ). Then using results from section IV and by the 
usual integral transformation technique 
, 1, ,j k i= … [1 ]iΣ 6
 
0( | ) ( ) ( | ) ( )m mLT LTp y g dg p y g dgθ ν θ ν+ =∫ ∫D 0 +
Σ
)d
)
      (14) 
( | ) ( )
mLT
p y g dgν += ∫   [definition of the right Haar integral, see e.g. Eaton (1989), p. 7] 
( 1) [1 ] 1
1 1
( | ) ( ) ( | ) ( ) 2 ( | ) | | ( )
m
m m
m mm i m i
iiLT i iLT PD
p y d p y d p y dθ ν θ θ θ θ+ + − − + − −= =≡ = ⋅ = Σ ⋅ Σ∏ ∏∫ ∫ ∫ 6
 
It follows that the prior for the covariance  (induced by the right Haar 
invariant measure on ) is 
mPDΣ ∈
mLT
+
 
[1 ] 1
1
( ) | | (
m i
i
dπ −=Σ ∝ Σ Σ∏ 6        (15) 
 
When used in Stone’s example B and assuming , (15) can not lead to strong 
inconsistency. In particular, (15) is exactly the prior recommended by Eaton and 
Sudderth (2010), proposition 4.1, for an m variate normal model with mean 0 and 
covariance  (written in a more elegant form). The use of (15) makes Bayesian 
inference consistent with a multivariate normal model, yet as emphasized by Eaton 
and Sudderth (1998) and evident from (15), it can not be cast in the form 
, for any  ( ). Needless to say, staying within 
theoretical framework of Eaton and Sudderth (1998,1999,2002), the Jeffreys’ prior i.e. 
2LTθ +∈
−
Σ
( )dπ Σ ∝ | | (dαΣ Σ α ∈ \ 1m >
( )dπ Σ ∝ 12( 1)| | (m d− +Σ )Σ , is prohibited being strongly inconsistent (incoherent). 
However as noted by Eaton and Sudderth (1999,2010) themselves, there is one 
conundrum connected with the above reasoning (which was also noticed much earlier 
by Stone (1965)). When one parameterizes the model (7) with , it becomes 2LTθ +∈
 13
only –invariant. In particular since permutation matrix does not belong to , 
the prior (15) is not invariant under the permutation of variables in the model. But 
this is an absolute minimum we require from the prior that possesses any attribute of 
invariance. Hence the prior (15) is consistent only with a model that is –
invariant. The reason why the available theory is helpless to resolve satisfactorily this 
puzzle is the fact that  is not amenable (for ) and amenability of a group 
is among the most important conditions to get the coherent inference. Since the 
amenability plays no role in our framework one may hope for some resolution. 
Indeed, this is the case. 
2LT
+
2LT
+
2LT
+
mGL 1m >
We will demonstrate that standard Jeffreys’ prior for Σ  may be consistent and 
that nonidentifiability of a model has nothing to do with the consistency. Without 
loss of generality, consider a variant of the model (7) in the form 
 
i iy uβ = ,          (16) 1,2.i =
 
where  is nonsingular. Clearly, if juxtaposed with (7), we identify . 
Incidentally, (16) is the model considered by Villegas (1971) and more importantly a 
simplistic version of the Structural VAR (SVAR) model (with no lags). Since (16) 
accommodates the SVAR specification, from the economic standpoint, (16) is more 
natural parameterization than (7) is. The model (16) is still invariant with the 
same action on the sample space as in (7) but the (left) action of  on the 
parameter space is defined as , where . Of course (16) 
remains unidentified. Now the data sampling density with respect to Lebesgue 
measure reads 
2 2β ×∈ \ 1β θ−=
2GL −
2GL
1:gβ β β −=6 D g 2g GL∈
 
( | )p y kβ = ⋅ 2 12| | etr{ }yyβ ′ ′− β β
g
m
       (17) 
 
As before, let us consider the general case of (16) where 
, hence . Moreover, to have a free action of  
on the sample space we assume n  and . Since  
 (see e.g. Eaton (1989), p. 9), denoting W  we get 
1: ( ) [ , , ]ny m n y y× = ∈… Y mGLβ ∈ mGL
m≥ rank( )y m= ( )
mGL
dgμ =
( )
mGL
dgν= = | | ( )mg d− β β′=
 
0( | ) ( ) ( | ) ( )mGL GLp y g dg p y g e dgβ ν ν=∫ ∫D D   [see section IV]  (18) 
1( | ) ( )
mGL
p y g dgν−= ∫      [ , ] 1:g gβ β −=D Ime ≡
 14
( | ) ( )
mGL
p y g dgμ= ∫      [see e.g. Nachbin (1965), p. 80] 
( | ) ( )
mGL
p y dβ μ β≡ ∫  
21 1 1
2 2 2( 1)1
2( | ) | | ( ) [ ( )] ( | ) | | ( )
m m
m m mm
m
GL PD
p y d p y W W dWβ β β β π− −−′= = Γ ⋅∫ ∫ +  
 
where the last equality follows by noting that  is only a function of β β  and 
using Hsu lemma (see e.g. Anderson (2003), p. 539), where  denotes the 
multivariate gamma function i.e. 
( | )p y β ′
()mΓ ⋅
1
4 ( 1) 1
21
( ) ( )
mm m i
m i
a π − −=Γ = Γ −∏ a . Further, since the 
covariance matrix is equal to  i.e. , taking into account the Jacobian 
, we obtain 
1W − 1W −Σ =
( )J W → Σ = ( 1)| | m− +Σ
 
21
2 ( 1)1
2( | ) ( ) [ ( )] ( | ) | | ( )m
m
m m
GL m
PD
p y d p y dβ μ β π − +−= Γ ⋅ Σ Σ∫ ∫ 12 m Σ
β
  (19) 
 
The formulas (18) and (19) may be summarized as follows. The right Haar invariant 
measure on  in extension of (16) to m variate case, induces the left Haar 
invariant prior on the parameter space i.e. . The latter implies the 
Jeffreys’ prior 
mGL −
( )dπ β ∝ | | ( )m dβ −
( )dπ Σ ∝ 12( 1)| | ( )m d− +Σ Σ  in an m variate normal model with mean 0 
and covariance Σ . More importantly, since the conditions of our theorem hold, both 
the prior  and the implied Jeffreys’ prior 
−
( )dπ β ∝ | | ( )m dβ − β ( )dπ Σ ∝ 12( 1)| | (m d− +Σ Σ)
β
t T
)
                                                
, 
lead to coherent Bayesian inference5. Needless to say, in contrast to (15) both 
 and the implied Jeffreys’ prior are invariant with respect to 
permutation of the variables in a model. To the extent that the formal arguments for 
use of the Jeffreys’ prior in a multivariate model with zero mean and unknown 
covariance “justify” its adoption in general linear regressions, SEM and VAR models, 
our coherence arguments “justify” the use of the prior 
 in the general SVAR model 
( )dπ β ∝ | | ( )m dβ −
1( , , , )pdA dA dAπ ∝… 1| | ( )( ) ( )m pA dA dA dA− …
 
1 1t t p t pAy Ay A y ε− −= + + +" ;      (20) 1, ,t = …
 
where ,  nonsingular,  and . mty ∈ \ : ( )A m m× : ( )iA m m× 1 2| , , (0, It t t my y Nε − − …∼
 
 
 
5 The assertion applies to a generalization of (16), when , . The corresponding 
priors for (16) proper are given by setting . 
1: ( ) [ , , ]ny m n y y× = ∈… Y mGLβ ∈
2m =
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VII. CONCLUSION 
We have established conditions which guarantee that Bayesian inference is 
consistent and coherent. In comparison with analogous conditions available in the 
literature we have replaced the technical requirement of the group amenability with 
more pleasant G  freeness assumption. In consequence our conditions allow us to 
cope with cases where the underlying group operating in a model is not amenable 
(e.g. a group of general nonsingular matrices). In this sense, our framework may be 
more useful in practice.  
−Θ
In the course of our analysis we reexamined the Stone’s (1976) example 
pointing to some flaws in his arguments. In the context of this example we 
encountered the prior for multivariate normal model recently proposed by Eaton and 
Sudderth (2010). The latter was given in more intuitive terms than in the original 
source. Lastly, we demonstrated that the Jeffreys’ prior in the multivariate normal 
model may be coherent. This last (seemingly innocent) conclusion is in fact quite new 
in the literature. We also proposed the prior for the Structural VAR models that 
result in the coherent inference. 
We think that attractiveness of our approach lies also in its simplicity. 
Compare the analogous framework in Eaton and Sudderth (1999,2002). Of course this 
happens at the cost of our restrictive G  freeness assumption. −Θ
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 16
APPENDIX: 
We denote with a bar above those elements in integrals that are fixed with 
respect to the integration process. This will facilitate to keep track of the algebraic 
manipulations used below. We need to prove (4). To this end we have 
0 0
0
(( , ), ) ( , | ) ( )
( , ) ( | )
( , | ) ( )
G
G
g w g p g w g dg
y d y
p g w g dg
φ θ θ ν
φ θ θ
θ ν
Π = ∫∫ ∫
D D
D
  [by (6)] 
Note that the denominator exists by our lemma so that  is proper which means 
that 
yΠ
( , ) ( | )y d yφ θ θΠ <∫ ∞ . Continuing  
0 0
0
(( , ), ) ( , | ) ( )
( , ) ( | )
( , | ) ( )
G
G
g w g p g w g dg
y d y
p g w g dg
φ θ θ ν
φ θ θ
θ ν
Π = ∫∫ ∫
D D
D
 
1 1
0 0
1
0
(( , ), ) ( , | ) ( )
( , | ) ( )
G
G
g g w p g g w dg
p g g w dg
φ θ θ ν
θ ν
− −
−=
∫
∫    [by (3) and assumption 6] 
0 0
0
(( , ), ) ( , | ) ( )
( , | ) ( )
G
G
gg w p gg w dg
p gg w dg
φ θ θ μ
θ μ
= ∫ ∫    [see e.g. Nachbin (1965), p. 80] 
1
0 0
1
0
( ) (( , ), ) ( , | ) (
( ) ( , | ) ( )
G
G
g g w p g w
g p g w dg
φ θ θ μ
θ μ
−
−
Δ ⋅
=
Δ ⋅
∫
∫
)dg
  [see e.g. Eaton (1989), p. 7] 
0 0
0
(( , ), ) ( , | ) ( )
( , | ) ( )
G
G
g w p g w dg
p g w dg
φ θ θ μ
θ μ
= ∫ ∫  
In the next to last line,  denotes the right hand modulus of G , see e.g. 
Eaton (1989), p. 7. 
:G +Δ → \
By expression (2) 
0 0( , ) ( | ) (( , ), ) ( , | ) ( ) ( )Gy d y g w p g w dg f wφ θ θ φ θ θ μΠ = ≡∫ ∫  
From the latter we conclude ( , ) ( | )y d yφ θ θΠ∫  does not depend on g , hence 
0 0
,
sup ( , ) ( | ) sup (( , ), ) ( | , ) sup (( , ), ) ( , | ) ( )G
y g w w
y d y g w d g w g w p g w dφ θ θ φ θ θ φ θ θ μΠ = Π =∫ ∫ ∫ g
Since 
0 0( , ) ( | ) (( , ), ) ( , | ) ( ) ( )Gy P dy g w g p g w g dg dwφ θ θ φ θ θ μ η= =∫ ∫ D D W  
1 1
0 0(( , ), ) ( , | ) ( ) ( )Gg g w p g g w dg dwφ θ θ μ η− −= ∫ W   [by (3) and assumption 6] 
0 0(( , ), ) ( , | ) ( ) ( )Gg w p g w dg dwφ θ θ μ η= ∫ W    [see e.g. Eaton (1989), p. 6] 
0 0( , ) ( | )y P dyφ θ θ= ∫  
It follows that  does not depend on  (  was arbitrary). Thus ( , ) ( | )y P dyφ θ θ∫ θ 0θ
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0 0inf ( , ) ( | ) ( , ) ( | ) (( , ), ) ( , | ) ( ) ( )Gy P dy y P dy g w p g w dg dwθ
φ θ θ φ θ θ φ θ θ μ η= =∫ ∫ ∫ W ≤
y
 
0 0 0 0{sup (( , ), ) ( , | ) ( )} ( ) sup (( , ), ) ( , | ) ( )G G
w w
g w p g w dg dw g w p g w dgφ θ θ μ η φ θ θ μ≤ ⋅ =∫ ∫ ∫W  
sup ( , ) ( | )
y
y dφ θ θ= Π∫      Q.E.D. 
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